Debates about legal ways of managing problem people and problem spaces sometimes end up in appellate courts. Existing critical analyses of such courts usually look only at the content of the decisions, content often said to be driven by racist, sexist, and/or classist interests. Content is also the focus of
AUTHORIZING THE PRODUCTION OF URBAN MORAL ORDER: APPELLATE COURTS AND THEIR KNOWLEDGE GAMES

Studying knowledge claims in legal networks: method and its effects
A central concern of law-and-society scholarship has been to map how extra-legal knowledge claims about social relations are introduced into legal processes, either as expert evidence or through other routes, and to document how courts and legislatures then do or don=t use these facts and claims. Studies along these lines B which are far too numerous to mention hereB generally focus on the content of the knowledge claims that are either accepted or rejected by various legal actors. They raise questions such as the following: Are legal processes increasingly influenced by technical expertise even as some forms of high science lose prestige? (Cole 2001 ) Why does epidemiological knowledge, which would seem more relevant to toxic tort cases, have less influence on courts than clinical judgements about individual patients? (Jasanoff 1995) What makes certain courts at certain times sympathetic or hostile to sociological and cultural evidence, e .g about racial difference? (E.g. Haney-Lopez 1996 , Valverde 2003 ) And at a more theoretical level, debates have taken place about whether >law= in general is increasingly governing through extra-legal >norms=, including scientific knowledge and statistics (Ewald 1991, Hunt and Wickham 1978) .
We have learned a great deal from such analyses of the fortunes and misfortunes of technical, scientific, and cultural knowledges within legal contexts, and ongoing work, especially in legal anthropology, promises to reveal a great deal more. But it is not my purpose here to add to this literature. Rather, my main purpose is to stimulate methodological innovation by encouraging analyses of knowledge processes in law that ask not about the content of claims but about process and flow B about how actors pick through documents or discourses and cobble together new >machines= for governing that recycle old bits in new ways (cf. Riles 2000) . And for sociolegal scholars who wish to go beyond existing single-site studies of the production of knowledge by experts, as well as beyond studies limited to courts= views about scientific evidence, much can be learned or adapted from studies located at the intersection of science studies and >actor-network= analysis (e.g. Latour and Woolgar 1979 , Latour 1987 , Latour 1993 , Winner 1986 , Woolgar 1988 , Barry and Slater 2002 . Such work is just beginning to have an impact on law-and-society circles.
i While neither the findings nor the methods of Actor Network Theory (Latour 1987 , Law 1999 , Law and Mol 2002 , can be directly applied to legal contexts, sociolegal studies that borrow from actor-network studies of knowledge can reveal processes that are generally obscured in more traditional, static analyses of knowledge in law.
Traditionally, knowledge has been considered as a thing possessed B or, in a more sophisticated framework, as a form of capital whose accumulation depends not only on formal schooling but also on familial and personal habits (Bourdieu 1987a ). The sort of study I attempt to pioneer here, by contrast, sees knowledge not as a kind of capital embodied in people, but as an ever-shifting network in which actors use legal or quasilegal tools to creatively recycle knowledge claims generated elsewhere. A key difference between Latour and Bourdieu is that the latter=s work is profoundly humanist: even when documenting unconscious and collective processes, rather than personal biographies (Bourdieu 1987b (Bourdieu , 1987a , the aim is to unmask the human relations of appropriation and social stratification that ground such apparently non-exploitative events and habits as going to museums. Latour=s work, by contrast, In reply, Bourdieu would no doubt say that Latour=s methodology renders exploitation and other systemic power relations invisible, given its insistence on isolating a network and studying its knowledge processes without regard to political preconditions and consequences. But one need not immediately proceed to take sides in this debate, or even see the problem as one of those either-or theoretical debates that so seldom produce any light. Given that, especially in Latour=s usage, concepts such as >actor= and >network= are merely tools, not parts of a general >theory= (see debate between Latour and John Law in Law 1999) , it should be possible for sociolegal scholars concerned about injustice and systemic inequality to borrow some tools from actor-network analysis for the limited purpose of analyzing the workings of a knowledge network, while complementing such an analysis with a substantive study of power relations. The case studies below are mainly concerned with tracing the dynamics of knowledge re-creation, for the sake of showing what one can do with this method, but they do signpost some of the wider, systemic social relations of inequality that constitute much of the substance of the knowledge claims whose transformations are being studied. A fuller study of the matters involved in the cases below would include a more traditional sociological analysis of conflicts and power relations.
Because of the focus on the dynamics of knowledge, in the studies presented here (as in some other work, e.g. Riles 2000) , the process of making knowledge claims appears an endless network in which the terms >production= and >consumption= are misleading. All consumption is necessarily also productive, if only because as >facts= move from one legal stage to the next they generally play a different role even if nothing is substantially added or subtracted. Latour=s ethnography of the Conseil d=Etat highlights the way in which (legal) inputs and outputs, production and consumption, are not separate operations. But, because he is borrowing from his own earlier ethnographies of a single lab, he limits his study to a single legal institution (Latour 2002) . However, as Bourdieu might have pointed out, making one institution into the object of one=s study has the inevitable if unintended effect of of reiforcing the institutional ideology of autonomy and formalism.
ii In my view, critical analyses of legal knowledge production need to take care to reveal the myriad ways in which both particular courts and law in general, contrary to the selfserving illusions created by formalism and by the strict legal hierarchy of courts, are epistemologically derivative and dependent, not only on other legal inputs but also on >extraneous= claims and extraneous authorities. But however one draws the line delimiting the network one wants to study, the general point of using actor-network models to study knowledge is to show how claims about social relations, including those presented formally as >evidence= but also those knowledges that have a less direct influence upon law, get moved around and transformed. And in the process, somewhat like the explorers= maps and other >immutable mobiles= influentially described by Latour (1987) iii , particular claims or sets of claims (e.g. a single fact, or a document introduced as an appendix to an affidavit) come to have novel uses and hence meanings as they are moved around, even if they retain their physical and textual integrity.
If one is interested in documenting the dynamics of legal knowledge flows, legal and political debates regarding urban ills and urban improvement are particularly well suited to serve as case studies. In some other situations courts may reject certain findings or dismiss certain experts as irrelevant, but there is little disagreement about the sort of knowledge claim that can be introduced and that is at least potentially admissible. In the specific context of appellate courts= reviews of laws and policies infringing on individual rights, certain types of laws B e.g. mandating seatbelts, or prohibiting smoking B may or may not succeed, legislatively or in the courts, but there is little room for debate about what would count as relevant evidence. Traffic experts would be expected to serve up statistics about accidents and public-health epidemiologists would be expected to provide statistics on second-hand smoking deaths, respectively.
By contrast with some other, better studied regulatory sites, the problematic space of >the city= (e.g. Williams 1985 , Sennett 1970 , Rabinow 1989 ) has been and remains a particularly hybrid space of governance, in that both the ills afflicting that conglomerate entity >the city= and the solutions proposed by reformers have generally been ontologically and epistemologically hybrid. For the Romantics, cities were unsanitary for the same reasons that they were ugly, and beautiful parks were regarded as solutions to social problems as well as aeshetic projects (Williams 1985) . Later in the nineteenth century, the temperance movement promoted a reform in urban consumption habits that they thought would simultaneously improve individual physical health, save >the race= from >degeneration=, and restore the free will of the liberal subject to its full vigour (Valverde 1998) . Along the same lines, English late
Victorian campaigns around >overcrowding= also treated the problem as simultaneously moral, economic, and physiological (Wohl 1983) . And today=s urban regeneration projects also work on the hybrid premise that physical beautification will automatically bring about social salvation, for the middle classes at any rate (Davis 1990 , Smith 1996 .
This marked hybridity, in which both the illness and its remedy are seen as naturally multitasking, is also found in the relevant legal networks. As Bill Novak=s comprehensive study of nineteenth century municipal ordinances shows, municipal legal tools have always included moral, cultural and aesthetic rationalities alongside public health and safety (Novak 1996 ; see also Vidlar 1991) . In the United
States, the persistence of non-utilitarian rationalities of urban governance has often been noted but explained exclusively as a result (and a tool) of racism (Delaney 2001 , Goldberg 2001 , Ford 2001 .
While not discounting this analysis, it is nevertheless important to note that in countries without a strongly marked racialization of urban geography, the same legal tools and many of the same legal rationalities exist. It is thus analytically dangerous (however politically useful it may be) to reduce issues of urban vice and virtue to >race=, or any other single issue. Neither race nor class nor sexuality, the three main dimensions of social life emphasized in the critical urban studies literature, clearly emerges from the existing literature as the real meaning of urban improvement projects. Moral concerns about sexual evils (especially prostitution, that age-old conglomerate of health, moral, and economic risks), racist fears about the barbarians within, and economically driven projects to constantly rescue the inner city from decline and >blight= have been and remain inextricably melded together. When we separate them or argue about which is more importan we end up with anachronistic analyses that fail to respect the sincere belief in hybrid solutions for hybrid ills that has driven urban reformers since the mid-nineteenth century.
If the field of the urban is markedly hybrid B which is not to say that other fields, such as health, are not hybrid, but simply to make a relative claim B, epistemological heterogeneity is also visibly greater in legal than in other (e.g. scientific) discourses, as a general rule. For example, as Cass Sunstein has pointed out, analogy is an ancient, prescientific mode of reasoning that is nevertheless openly accepted as a way of making determinations in law (Sunstein 1993) alongside more >rational= modern modes of reasoning. In addition, epistemological heterogeneity is actively encouraged by the technical features of the adversarial system, for in such a system (by contrast with inquisitorial jurisdictions), it is advantageous for lawyers to pile up totally divergent and even contradictory arguments, in the hopes that the court will accept at least one or two of them.
Thus, municipal matters, both because they are legal and because they involve that hybrid assemblage of moral-physical risks known as >the urban=, are particularly well suited to a study that is concerned to document the creative mixing and remixing of different kinds of knowledge claims. Neverthless, the easy blending, without much worry about coherence, of totally divergent knowledge frameworks, is neither unique to law B political debate is also markedly hybrid, with speakers rarely being expected to stick to one mode of reasoning B nor unique to the municipal realm. Indeed, one of the two case studies below, on the Canadian law criminalizing public transactions about prostitution, is not, legally, a municipal affair, since it involved a constitutional challenge to sections of the Criminal Code of Canada. But here too the urban was the site of the >crime= in question. Perhaps because of that, moral, economic, social, cultural, and gender issues were mixed with great abandon not only by those who participated in the consultations but even at the Supreme Court itself.
This challenges most accepted accounts of modern knowledge. Traditional intellectual histories tend to trace the evolution and ultimate triumph of science over other modes of reasoning B an account which flies in the face of many features of legal knowledge production (Sunstein 1993 , Valverde 2003 . More recent critical studies eschew Whig evolutionism, but they too tend to see science as increasingly autonomous and increasingly powerful. Specifically, Bruno Latour=s influential book We have never been modern argues that since the scientific revolution there have been two main lines of modern discourse, one pursued by the natural sciences, and another, opposite one developed by the cultural and human sciences (Latour 1993) . Arguing about whether X is natural or social, Latour notes, the two sides have nevertheless implicitly agreed to never question the underlying epistemological assumption that the role of modern thought is to define everything as either natural or cultural, either physical or moral, either real or socially constructed. But as Latour, interestingly, does not explicitly point out in his recent study of the workings of law at the Conseil d=Etat (Latour 2002) , legal networks seem to be an exception to this rule of purity-seeking. In a sociological context one strives to cleanse one=s argument of all vestiges of technological determinism as well as all traces of that dreaded Other, biologism; while in a hard-science context one strives to eliminate social and cultural influences bearing upon the experimental results. By contrast, in a court of law, it seems to add weight to one=s argument if one, say, introduces evidence that nude dancing in a strip club is a potential health hazard as well as source of moral blight. Law, it seems, does not wish to be modern.
iv Hence, while in some contexts (e.g. criminal trials whose outcome hinges on DNA evidence) it makes sense to ask whether law is dominated by extralegal scientific knowledges, in a good number of lowerprofile legal arenas one cannot pose the question of knowledge in an either-or fashion. Judicial review of municipal ordinances setting out special zoning requirements for porn shops or strip bars can nowadays include planners= or sociologists= studies of property values, crime, traffic, and so on, and sometimes such studies are mandatory: but that does not mean that a scientific logic is driving out moral logics. In some areas of law, science may well drive out other types of claims, but in at least some areas of law, knowledge is not a zero-sum game.
That knowledge is not a zero-sum game is also the beginning point of studies generated by Gunter
Teubner and other legal theorists promoting the >autopoeisis= view. The analysis elaborated here acknowledges that legal networks transform knowledges: but it does not support Gunter Teubner=s claims about the unidirectional absorption of extralegal facts into a separate legal realm (especially Teubner 1989) . Certain courts have the last word as a matter of institutional capital, but legal closure does not put an end to or retroactively fix the meaning of the knowledge games played in and around courts. Using Latour=s framework, I prefer to argue that knowledge claims have no essence: they only have uses, and the use changes every time that the object is transported from one network to another.
Teubner would agree that claims have no essence, since his analysis, unlike most others, is not static: but his model is unidirectional, with >law= having an intrinsic tendency to become more and more autonomous as >society= becomes, Durkheim-fashion, increasingly differentiated. For those of us who are suspicious of evolutionary one-way models, it is more useful to look at the knowledge game not as an upward line but as a constantly shifting circular shape. Hence the usefulness of Latour=s term >network=, despite the fact, noted by Latour himself (in Law 1999) , that after the World Wide Web it is difficult to detach the word >network= from that particular set of practices. In a network, the beginning and the (always temporary) end are purposively chosen by the researcher, not objectively given.
In the urban law network, largely textual entities move along the network but change their character even when they are not excerpted or otherwise manipulated. For instance: for the consultants who produce them, studies of urban problems produced to justify zoning ordinances are money-making commodities; for the city council that uses them, they are legal capital; for the businesses or civil liberties groups challenging the ordinance, they are enemy weapons that need neutralizing; for the appellate courts, they are mainly procedural entities. The occasional sociologist who reads the study in question for its scientific value is not a superior reader, even if he/she is the only one without a legal ax to grind:
he/she is simply an actor in a different, mostly non-legal network. And this article is in turn not a bird=s-eye account from >above=, but rather another actor that is mainly located in the law-and-society scholarly network but that overlaps at crucial points with >real-life= legal and urban-governance networks. While some Actor-Network scholars write as if their own accounts are non-networked and are above the fray, I think it is more consistent to regard scholarly work as being next to and overlapping with the networks one studies, not in some superior epistemological realm.
As a note on reflexivity, then, it is worth noting that sociologists and other producers of extralegal expert knowledge wring their hands when they see that courts either misinterpret or, more commonly, ignore the carefully produced affidavits and studies submitted in support of various legal claims B but what the expert experiences as the passive and humiliating condition of being ignored is for the judicial network in question a highly productive use of knowledge (Cole 2001 , Valverde 1996 . Expert evidence is of course not the only input that is subjected to often ruthless forms of excerpting, synthesis, decontextualization, and rejection. In our own time, appellate courts are bombarded with texts claiming the status of evidence. The network of judicial review would instantly collapse if all the available substantive information relevant to a certain decision or policy were consistently and immediately treated by courts as legal content v . The extralegal knowledges have to be managed, and this is done in part by reducing documents and testimony to a shadowy, almost content-free bureaucratic existence. In the case of the US Supreme Court=s decision in Alameda Books studied below, the court notes that the city had a study to back up its zoning ordinance and that the study could reasonably be placed within the quite large universe of studies of urban problems that might have backed up not so much the specifics of the ordinance (which were in no way supported or even mentioned in the study) but rather the general municipal policy to restrict porn shops. And that was enough.
In this way, an old study comparing crime rates across neighbourhoods was turned into an almost wholly formal entity, whose main virtue was that it existed and it dealt with some harm (crime, in this case) which the reasonable person might think has some, not necessarily specified relationship to the target of the ordinance (porn shops). Now, it would be easy to ridicule the Supreme Court for this curious logic. But this would be foolish. been produced. While specifically engaged in producing law, then, courts also contribute to a more general process of bureaucratic inscription (see Poovey 1998 , Ericson and Haggerty 1997 , Curtis 2001 . Through bureaucratic inscription, life events with highly personal meanings, and all sorts of other bits of information, are first turned into ink markings on a page, and are then homogenized and standardized by the imposition of a format that allows for tabulation, quick scanning, and inter-individual and inter-group comparison by future paper-pushers in the same or in other agencies.
We will continue this analysis now in a more grounded manner, having, one hopes, laid out the basic methodological shape of an approach that does not make judgements about >right= and >wrong= uses of social science or other knowledges, and that seeks instead to understand how knowledge claims generated by certain extralegal (or legal) actors undergo a sort of transubstantiation by being placed in a different, judicially run network. Along the network, the effective meaning of knowledge claims is dependent not only on the location and status of the user (as autopoesis scholars and other sociologists of knowledge have documented), but also B and this has not generally been studied B on the specific features and limitations inherent in particular knowledge moves, that is, the site-specific or field-specific techniques vi for using, reducing, and synthesizing knowledge claims that enable the transubstantiation of knowledges.
A well-known but rarely examined legal tool to work up and test knowledge claims, then, such as judicial review, can thus be seen as a knowledge machine made up of certain specific wheels and cogs B not all of which are used every timeB which enable certain kinds of knowledge processes but forbid others. Constitutional challenges, the other basic legal manouvre studied here, can similarly be seen as a knowledge machine that, while flexible to some extent, has certain features that make knowledge claims get transformed in certain ways. The results are never predictable from the start, since the substantive issues involved in a particular case cannot ever be set completely aside. But highlighting the dynamics of knowledge processes while backgrounding the >content= and the politics of the case to some extent B an extent that cannot be theoretically determined in advance B can lead to new insights about the taken-forgranted machinery of law. The machinery of law is often dismissed by critical legal scholars as >nuts and bolts= or >technical detail=, and thus blackboxed B with the contents of the black box being left to the >blackletter= law professors. The approach presented here may be largely derived from contemporary european social theory; but it has an old-fashioned virtue, namely, respecting the specificity (which I do not regard as an autonomy) of legal complexes (Rose and Valverde 1998) , and attempting to generate new insights into specific legal mechanisms.
Let us now proceed to make all of this concrete.
Nuisance or crime? Street soliciting and lay knowledges of jurisdiction
The word >harm= has been used mor frequently than the word >nuisance= in the context of the discussion concerning the problems related to street prostitution. While the term >nuisance= might be more appropriate from a legal perspective, the affected public felt that it was not broad enough to cover the real impact of street prostitution on their lives. (Canada, Department of Justice [1998] , Executive Summary).
This statement, drawn from the Report of the 1998 Canadian Federal-Provincial Working Group on Prostitution, encapsulates the key legal dilemma in the long-running discussions about what is to be done about the fact that, since brothels are illegal in Canada, much of the business of prostitution (which is not illegal), is conducted in public spaces, to the annoyance of those described as Athe public@. Although in strict legal terms an activity can only fall under the crime of Acommon nuisance@ (as opposed to the torts of private and public nuisance that are available in Canada as elsewhere) if it harms the citizens in general (Bilson, 1991, 158-9) , as used in the voluminous political and legal discussions on street prostitution, the term Athe public@ does not in fact refer to Aall the subjects of Her Majesty in Canada@, which is how the relevant section of the common nuisance statute defines the group that has to be affected before the nuisance can turn into a crime. (In Canada, provinces have their own family and civil law but criminal law is federal). The term does not even include everyone who is present within shouting distance, which is often what >the public= amounts to in such legally similar contexts as liquor licensing hearings and municipal zoning decisions. First, the term >public= invariably excludes all women who have engaged, are engaging, or may in the future engage in prostitution. Perhaps more significant demographically, it also excludes that proportion of the male public that is made up of actual or potential customers. And yet, the >public= is simultaneously expanded to include everyone in Canada B as the noise and disorder periodically experienced in a few notorious streetcorners in a few Canadian cities vii becomes, in political and legal debates, a supralocal, national menace that cannot be handled by municipal bylaws.
The political/legal debates around the >communicating for the purposes of prostitution= criminal offence created in 1985 went through the following political-legal stages. First, police departments and some mayors, whose sidewalk clean-up efforts were constrained by a court decision that had ruled that soliciting needs to be Apressing and persistent@ before it can be said to constitute a crime, lobbied the federal government for a new law (Brock 1998 , chapter 3). The federal government thus introduced Bill C-49, criminalizing all communication in public spaces for the purposes of prostitution. >Communication= B rather than >soliciting= B was put in to include (male) johns in the sweeps, thus responding to feminist criticisms about the use of prostitution laws to target women. This bill became law on Jan. 1, 1986, after The federal government and those provinces that intervened in the Reference used, as their main stock of knowledge claims about street prostitution, the transcripts of the 1985 parliamentary hearings. There was of course a huge outpouring of media and other discourse on the social and legal issues at hand, but for the sake of tracing the relevant network, I have relied mainly on the texts that eventually made it to the Supreme Court: the thousand or so pages of transcripts of hearings, the briefs submitted by governments and by intervenor groups, and the decisions themselves.
Examining the wide range of claims about street soliciting and its risks reproduced along this network reveals that the contrast between >harm= vs >nuisance= set out in the quotation prefacing this section repeatedly appeared as a crucial tool. The point of view that eventually prevailed in both Parliament and at the Supreme Court B that street soliciting is not a >mere= nuisance, being more of a >harm= and thus warranting criminalization B consistently used the nuisance/crime distinction as a decisive switchpoint:
but, interestingly, >nuisance= was never defined by them, being used merely as a negative term. Although both provincial civil law and the federal Criminal Code make brave efforts to define the admittedly fuzzy category of >nuisance=, and case law has articulated some principles, chief among them Athe quiet enjoyment of one=s property@, (Bilson 1991 , Buckley 1996 , Cooper 2002 , none of the lawyers and judges participating in the debates bothered to define or even describe >nuisance=.
In the absence of definition, it was possible to use the term >nuisance= B which like many other legal terms has the linguistic virtue of having non-legal connotations and usages that may be usefully triggered by legal actors (as in >what a nuisance!=)B in very different ways. One knowledge move was performed by those who, relying on the existence of ancient jurisdictional divides, argued that if street soliciting constituted a nuisance, it should therefore be left to municipalities to regulate, since by the very fact of being a nuisance it was not a crime. (This argument of course relied on eliminating from the picture the crime of >common nuisance=, but since this section is very rarely used, and has no clear case law, this was not difficult to do.) Let us call this the >crime vs. nuisance= argument.
The majority opinions among the high-level legal actors (Supreme Court justices and government lawyers) performed a different move, however. The legal knowledge move that emerged as successful was the building of a slippery slope leading from a bunch of hard-to-prosecute nuisances not to a better nuisance law, but directly, without passing through any other alternative, to a criminal statute. Ignoring one of the key jurisdictional building blocks of the Canadian constitution (namely, that the federal government decides the criminal law, but provinces decide on civil and municipal law, including public nuisance), various authoritative legal texts, culminating with a 4-2 decision of the Supreme Court, argued that the new criminal statute was warranted because prostitution is a Asocial@ or a Apublic@ nuisance.
In yet a third deployment of the nuisance/crime pair, the dissenting opinion, by the court=s leading feminist justices, concurred that prostitution is indeed a social nuisance: but for them that was precisely the reason why it ought not to be criminalized. Creatively inventing a distinction hitherto unknown to law, they decided to draw a line sharply separating a Alegal@ nuisance from a Asocial@, hence nonlegal nuisance. The feminist minority might well have objected to the majority=s cavalier treatment of the nuisance/crime distinction, and argued simply that if it is a nuisance then it falls to provinces and cities to regulate it, not to the federal government to criminalize it. But perhaps because they did not want to accuse their colleagues of being sloppy about law, they deployed the contrast between Asocial@ and Alegal@, so dear to the heart of sociolegal scholarship, to move street soliciting out of the criminal code and into the realm of social work and social solutions.
But taking such liberties with law=s categories was only observable at the Supreme Court. At the parliamentary hearings, neither citizens nor politicians imagined that one could label something a nuisance and still criminalize it. Thus, the nuisance vs. crime opposition was repeatedly made by residents of neighbourhoods affected by john and prostitute activity. A representative of a Vancouver neighbourhood appeared before the parliamentary committee to say: AIn our community the word >nuisance= is ridiculous. A nuisance is the person who squealed his tires... A nuisance is not 400 johns driving around. It is a disaster.@ (Hansard 24 Oct. 1985, 4:47) . The Member of Parliament for that neighbourhood, present at the same hearing, supported this:
I have had many, many phone calls and would certainly confirm the kind of neighbourhood...
[ellipsis in original] not nuisances, as the witness said, but real harassment that has been going on. There is not question the rights of the neighbourhood have to be a very major concern.
(Hansard 24 Oct. 1985, 4:52).
For her, her own neighbourhood=s problems were such as to warrant a nation-wide new criminal law: The separation of crime from nuisance was also performed by most of the opponents of the new law.
They routinely argued that since soliciting only caused a nuisance, it was therefore not a proper object of the criminal code. Like the citizens on the other side of the debate, they too assumed the federal/provincial, crime/nuisance legal-political binary to be fixed, and simply argued the other side of the same coin.
A speaker who, exceptionally, cited common-law principles of nuisance was the left-wing and feminist mayor of the city of Ottawa, Marion Dewar, the only mayor appearing at the hearings to oppose the criminalization of public soliciting. She argued that criminalization was inappropriate because Ait seems to me from all the evidence that the results of street soliciting are of a nuisance nature and relate to the enjoyment of public streets and private property, which can be addressed by municipal regulation@ (Hansard, 29 Oct 1985, 5:7) . Similarly, Lucie Pepin, Liberal MP for the Montreal neighbourhood of Outremont, also attempted to use legal tools to narrow the scope of the bill, during the clause-by-clause discussion in the Commons Committee in which she appears to have served as token feminist. The wording of the Bill (Astops or attempts to stop any person or in any manner communicates or attempts to communicate for the purposes of...@) was too broad an attack on freedom of expression and movement as well as on the prostitutes= right to make a living, Pepin argued. The new crime of communicating for the purposes of prostitution, however, did not manage to free itself from the spectre of the path not taken, that is, the spectre of nuisance. Civil libertarian interventions continued to argue that soliciting is a >mere= nuisance, not a crime ix . But the court=s majority decision proclaimed that street soliciting is a crime because it is a B big, or social, or compositeB nuisance, and as we have seen the feminist minority did not directly challenge this, offering instead a curious distinction between a >legal= nuisance and a >social=, that is, non-criminal, nuisance. Interestingly, none of the participants suggested designating soliciting as falling under the (admittedly very rarely used) Criminal
Code section on Acommon nuisance@, which was as a matter of legal fact the only possible legal manouvre that would have successfully got around the nuisance vs. crime distinction. The running together of nuisance and crime thus came to prevail over the more legally correct move of separating nuisance from crime and local regulation from national criminal law.
For our purposes, the most interesting finding is that the residents, mayors, city officials, and other speakers at the hearing about the proposed law seemed to know the law better than the Supreme Court, in that they took it absolutely for granted that if they defined street soliciting as a >nuisance=, then they were automatically removing it from federal criminal jurisdiction. The Supreme Court, by contrast, proceeded to deconstruct the nuisance/crime legal binary. The knowledge claims deployed to deconstruct this ancient legal binary were not necessarily made explicit in the judgement, but one can detect their iceberg-like presence by paying close attention to some of the textual detail of the judgement and of a few texts that were part of the Court=s network. The knowledge iceberg whose tip emerges here and there in the Court=s judgement turned out to be none other than that powerful actor of 1980s urban sociology, namely, the broken-windows theory of disorder and crime.
Nuisance as crime: broken-windows urban sociology at the Supreme Court of Canada
Very few witnesses appearing before the parliamentary committee cited scholarly studies; by and large, they took the standpoint of >experience= B even in the case of people such as police chiefs and mayors.
But once the local experiences of constant noise and harassment of local women by johns and so forth entered into the strictly legal network, being either synthesized or, more commonly, indirectly alluded to, the neighbours= experience turned into a different epistemological object. Alluding to other, unnamed people=s experience generates abstract conceptual objects (urban blight; incivilities; disorder x ) whose abstractness is obscured by the constant references to urban >experience=.
The allusive deployment of other people=s urban experience B a technique that law has in common with politics, but which is sharply frowned upon in the social sciences B was used in several of the briefs submitted by Attorneys General xi , in which government lawyers echoed, without citing it, the theory of urban decay that had become popular in the 1980s: the broken-windows theory of crime and disorder.
The broken-windows theory (or more accurately, metaphor), developed by James Q Wilson and others as an attack on the increased judicial recognition of the individual rights of street drunks, panhandlers and other >undesirables= in the 1960s and 1970s, was very useful in the Canadian government=s campaign to criminalize soliciting (Wilson and Kelling 1982) .
From the constitutional law standpoint, the 1985 >communicating= law had serious flaws. By banning communication not just near residences or even on streets, but throughout the whole public realm, it was on its face overinclusive; the lack of fit with rights jurisprudence was compounded by the lack of any requirement that the prosecutor produce evidence of harm or even annoyance. The broken windows thesis, which, as is well known, argues that litter on sidewalks, broken-down cars, and buildings in disrepair are reliable indicators of urban decay even if they do not cause any actual harm, was hence a powerful debating weapon. The broken windows thesis was not introduced via expert studies: neither James Q Wilson nor George Kelling made an explicit appearance in any of the texts. But the same arguments about preventive policing and about the cumulative impact of small disorders were imported through the recycling of the legal term >nuisance=, severed from its actual context in Canadian law. One could thus say that the >communicating= statute, which was at risk of failing within the purely legal network of constitutional law, succeeded by being linked to the non-legal but politically very powerful network of urban-disorder talk.
However, the extralegal network of broken-windows sociology remained somewhat submerged. A superficial look at the court documents might make one think that extralegal social evidence was indeed used. For example, the briefs by the Attorneys General of British Columbia, Ontario, and Canada, do footnote some of their claims about the inevitable association of street prostitution with urban decay and degeneration. However, when one looks more closely, it becomes clear that the footnotes consist mainly of references to the parliamentary hearings sampled above (which featured no sociologists) and to government reports that contain at least as much unsupported opinion as factual evidence.
Anecdote and opinion from citizens living in areas in which prostitutes work is of course a valid political/legal commodity, even if it is not social science. But the experiences and opinions in question could have served equally well to support a regulatory local strategy, since the experiences were sited in specific neighbourhoods, indeed in particular streetcorners. And perhaps because to lawyers, discussions about street noise would naturally suggest regulation, not criminalization, even high-status legal speakers sometimes forgot that they were supposed to be supporting a crime, not a new nuisance bylaw. The Attorney General of Canada=s brief to the Supreme Court argued that the impugned statute was constitutional because it was Aat worst@ Aa >time and place regulation=@ B an obviously false statement, since there is no time in which soliciting is allowed, and the space on which it is banned is the whole of the public sphere, including cars. The fact that criminal statutes are in general distinguishable from local regulation precisely because the criminal code does not deal in time and place requirements seems to have escaped the writer, who thus generated a text that, like the Supreme Court majority decision, completely deconstructs its own key binary (harm/crime vs. nuisance/regulation).
Similarly, when introducing the bill in the House of Commons, Justice Minister John Crosbie slipped into the (municipal) language of streets and neighbourhoods:
The purpose of this Bill is to help the citizens of this country who live in certain of our major urban areas and the police forces of this country to regain the streets because they have lost control of the streets and neighbourhoods in certain urban areas of this country..
. (Cited in
Factum of the Attorney General of Canada, Par. 5; emphases added).
The neighbourhood, of course, is not an element of the criminal law: it is the key figure or object of municipal zoning and planning.
Neighbourhood vs. nation; municipality vs. central state; nuisance vs. the criminal code B these pairs of opposites were, as we saw earlier, deployed as opposites in order to produce the argument that neither provincial nuisance law (which is mainly enforced by municipalities) nor regulatory tools like zoning and noise bylaws were sufficient to address the grave (national) harm posed by street soliciting. But the pairs of legal and symbolic opposites were constantly being brought back together again, in a move that logically contradicts the first, but which seems to have worked well to get the law passed. Crosbie=s speech embodies the >nuisance IS crime= strategy perfectly, since, although as a matter of fact it was part of speech calling on Parliament to create a new crime, it could just as well have functioned as the >whereas= clause justifying a municipal zoning bylaw.
When all of this reached the Supreme Court, then in the very early years of Charter jurisprudence, there was clearly an embarassment of legal as well as political and symbolic riches. The Court dealt with numerous arguments, such as discussions about the limits on freedom of commercial speech, that do not concern us here, since they are part of a different network and in any case they were not decisive. Let us here focus only on the network of nuisance/crime.
We saw earlier that the Attorney General of Canada=s brief claimed that the new crime of communicating for the purposes of prostitution was a mere >time and place regulation=, and was hence not out of keeping with the Charter of Rights. Elsewhere the brief describes the harms targeted by the new criminal law as a Apublic nuisance@ (Par 3) B a curious manouvre, given that public nuisance is not within federal jurisdiction. But then, in the next paragraph, the writer hits on a novel term that is not quite as reminiscent of municipal governance: Asocial nuisance@ (emphasis added). Prostitution itself is legal, the writer states, but the transactions around it cause a Asocial@ nuisance (Par 4). (That the transactions have to be conducted in public because brothels are illegal in Canada is of course not mentioned).
The Ontario government=s brief does not employ the term Apublic nuisance@, perhaps because the Attorney General of the province, unlike the federal one, knew that public nuisance is not a federal crime; but otherwise makes the same moves as the federal brief, even using the same nonlegal term:
By way of conclusion, it is respectfully submitted that when one weighs the serious social It is very difficult, senator, to establish the causal nexus between the conduct of an individual and the resulting nuisance. The problem in most of the communities that are affected by street prostitution is that there is a cumulative effect. It is the result of so many prostitutes being present, so many prospective customers and so many individuals who are simply cruising to watch the action. To link the nuisance occasioned to the residents of that district to the conduct of one individual would be virtually impossible in a criminal prosecution.... (Hansard, 3 Dec. 1985, 30:19) .
The police prefer criminal public morals statutes because one need not prove anything about the individual or social effects of the crime; whether someone was actually incovenienced by Madam X=s sidewalk behaviour is irrelevant to the criminal law, while it is the very essence of nuisance law. Some of the evidence that had come up at earlier points in the network suggests that some police forces had in fact not vigorously used available the legal tools, in the years leading up to the new statute, precisely in order to promote the sort of chaos that could be expected to lead to a new criminal offence being put in the Criminal Code. In addition to possible activity by the police to deliberately increase urban disorder there was the fact, which surfaced during the appeal of the Halifax Skinner case, that soliciting-related disorder had increased in Halifax only after the police force had, for unrelated reasons, gone on strike.
But the interests of the police and their indirect law-reform efforts, mentioned a few times by prostitute groups and their allies at the hearings, were cleansed from the strictly legal components of the knowledge network. Attorney-General affidavits and court judgements contained no references whatsoever to the police as active participants in the law-making process. Thus, Mosley=s incautious remarks about how law enforcement difficulties prompt police to favour using the criminal code as a blunt tool of social order were left behind in the legal procession up to the Supreme Court.
While offering a more morally conservative view of the purposes of the law than that given by his more liberal colleague Justice Dickson, Justice Antonio Lamer, in his concurring judgement, nevertheless agreed that the communication law is a piece of social engineering, an actor in a sociological network.
According to him, it targets not the usual object of criminal law B the individual=s will B but rather a sociological entity, a risk entity to be exact, also described as Acumulative@. And while happily using the term >nuisance= to describe a crime, he adds another term, not used by other participants, taken straight from the field of urban planning and zoning: >blight=, thus adding another actor creating a link between criminal law and municipal regulation.
Urban blight is generally associated with run-down shops, boarded-up buildings, unoccupied real estate, and so on, which are often empirically correlated with street prostitution activity, but which are not, in law, criminal harms. But, once more drawing on the powerful cultural resources of the broken-windows school, and on the equally powerful, convergent legal tradition of preventive police powers (Dubber 2002 ), Lamer writes:
I do pause to note, however, that the appellants correctly point out that the act of soliciting by a single prostitute may not by itself produce a nuisance. But this argument, with respect, misses the point that the legislation is designed to prevent the congregation of prostitutes and customers in the streets. It is the cumulative effect of this congregation that produces nuisance and blight. (Reference 1990, 120 
So the feminist and J.S. Mill enthusiast Bertha Wilson accepts that soliciting does cause a Asocial@
nuisance. But whereas for her male colleagues this knowledge claim necessarily leads to the conclusion that, since a nuisance that is an aggregate B i.e. Asocial@ B amounts to a crime, for Wilson, a social nuisance requires a social solution. Wilson does not dispute that the line between nuisance and crime is fine indeed (and she could not dispute this without challenging a large part of the federal police powers).
She simply proceeds to separate the two entities that her colleagues had joined, saying that the legislative target was Aa social rather than a legal nuisance.@ (Reference 1990, 130).
Thus, she agrees with her colleagues= legally odd claim about soliciting as a Asocial@ nuisance: but instead of using the adjective >social= to point in the direction of grave ills requiring a criminal code response, she uses it for the opposite purpose, namely, to separate social problems off as a distinct area of governance not properly within the scope of federal criminal powers. Whereas for the majority the social/sociological network converges with the legal network in such a way as to generate a new crime, a crime whose harm does not lie in the actus reus or the mens rea but in the sociological, aggregate impact of a certain type of behaviour, for the two women justices, the social network diverges from law.
They would want to see street prostitutes diverted to the network of social knowledges about urban ills
B what Canadians call the social safety net, perhaps, though they are not explicit on this point. In this way the two justices enact an older, progressive view of the relation between >legal= and >social=, the view that led in the 1960s to the decriminalization of a variety of sexual behaviours, whereas the majority adopts the post-liberal claim B commonly made by advocates of zero-tolerance policies at all levels B that the criminal law can and should be used to govern social, aggregate ills.
The city as an ethical machine: hybrid knowledges of urban vice in US >adult= zoning
The above case study has shown how the Canadian goverment, faced with an appellate court decision that gave street prostitutes some measure of speech and economic rights, gave urban police forces and moral-reform mayors renewed powers to prosecute both johns and working women by means of a new crime B communicating in a public place for the purposes of prostitution. By contrast, Mayor Giuliani=s efforts to use zoning and other minor legal practices of urban regulation to clean up Manhattan, driving out porn shops as well as panhandlers, drew only on existing tools of urban law, tools that, especially in the US, with its powerful First Amendment, are better than criminal statutes as weapons in campaigns involving breaching the constitutional rights of citizens engaged in disreputable activities. In this comparison, national differences should not be exaggerated. It is true that in the US today it would be very difficult to criminalize any form of Acommunication@ not associated with the spectre of terrorism; but nevertheless, it has not proved impossible to use the criminal law against all manner of tenuous moral dangers (Dubber 2002) . The use of urban legal tools, zoning ordinances in particular, is thus not the only possible route open to urban clean-up authorities in the US. And Canadian authorities have also often used purely local legal tools, such as the licensing of massage parlors, to effect downtown moral cleanup campaigns (Brock 1998) .
The use of the urban-law toolbox to create civic virtue and order is thus not unique to either the US or to conservative activists like Mayor Giuliani and James Q Wilson. Some commentators believe that the use of zoning bylaws for social/moral ordering purposes is a new tactic used by the New Right to effect their puritanical plans (e.g. Papayanis 2000) . But when put in the context of the history of zoning and urban law generally (e.g. Frug 1999 , Novak 1996 , Smith 1996 , the new bylaws do not appear exceptionally draconian. In fact, the opposite is the case: businesses that happen to enjoy some First Amendment protection (and stripping as well as reading porn have in recent years come to be considered as expressive actitivities) have a much greater ability to challenge urban regulations than do the businesses that see a lot of popular speech inside their walls (hair salons, pawnshops, taverns, billiard halls, etc) but whose age-old targeting by licensing and zoning techniques is rarely subject to judicial review. This is why we have appellate court cases on >adult zoning=and on strip-club regulation (and on billboards, too), whereas we have virtually no appellate court cases through which one can investigate how municipal or state authorities justify onerous regulatory provisions applying to other establishments traditionally subject to special regulations about opening hours, location, noise, police supervision, parking, and so on.
This case study will focus primarily on the sewers would serve to promote morality as well as health; that the architectural design of a public housing project can incite tenants to new heights of virtue as well as achieving engineering excellence B these are the longstanding assumptions and hopes of urban reform since the eighteenth century (Joyce 2003 , Williams 1985 . The mixing of moral and economic values, cultural and material rationalities, has certainly been noticed by scholars, who often chastise urban planners as well as appellate courts for >contaminating= practical urban reform projects with moral and aesthetic desires, thus dismissing or black boxing the hybridity or heterogeneity of the urban as a problem space.
The second kind of heterogeneity, by contrast, has not been thus far noticed in the literature, as far as I
know. This is a temporal hybridity that complements the better-known ontological hybridity that would hardwire moral reform to physical improvement. We already saw, in the prostitution case study above, that political and legal discourses on street soliciting were remarkably cavalier about causality, not usually distinguishing the claim that soliciting has already caused identifiable harm from the temporally quite distinct claim that the habitual use of urban spaces for purposes of sexual transactions might at some future point bring about social and/or economic evils. In Canadian jurisprudence this can be easily identified as the slippage from Aharm@ to Arisk@, as in the ubiquitous phrase, Arisk of harm@, which manages to deploy the utilitarian rational prestige of the Mill harm principle to support often speculative claims about the (future) risks associated with this or that activity (cf. Harcourt 1999).
In US zoning law, one common term that embodies and performs this temporal hybridity is Ablight@.
Two examples of the use of Ablight@ from adult zoning cases will suffice Balthough it should be noted that there is another powerful jurisprudence of Ablight@ through which run-down houses, blocks, and whole neighbourhoods were torn down in the heyday of >urban renewal= and >slum clearance=, mainly in the This temporal ambiguity or hybridity replicates the curious temporality of the Ablighted hopes@ of Victorian novels, which were faithfully reflected in late Victorian jurisprudence about bankruptcy, libel, and breaches of promise of marriage. In this civil jurisprudence of >blighted hopes=, it was not necessary to actually prove that the plaintiff had already suffered measurable harm: courts took it as >common knowledge= that the plaintiff=s future would be dim indeed. Ill effects could thus be presumed. Since the >blighted hopes= jurisprudence uses exactly the same temporal logic as the broken-windows theory of urban disorder it is perhaps not too digressionary to quote just one of the numerous >blighted hopes= tort decisions:
In contemplation of law, reputation is a delicate plant, withered by the breath of scandal. Any publication which imputes to another conduct which right-thinking men condemn... is presumed in law to have injuriously affected the reputation of the person so assailed, and, by such injury, Following this same logic, the Canadian Supreme Court, in the >Reference= discussed above, stated that one need not prove that a particular act of street soliciting caused harm to an identifiable victim in order to prosecute, since, once labelled as a >social nuisance=, street soliciting could be presumed to cause damage to the community B to the Asocial@B , if not to any one individual. The same logic was at work in the use of zoning ordinances to rid Manhattan of disreputable activities, and was also, not coincidentally, foreshadowed in the original >Broken Windows= article (Wilson and Kelling 1982) . That seminal article claimed that even if panhandling, public drinking and broken windows do not actually lead to crime or other serious harms, nevertheless, they damage the community=s reputation, and this damage to perceptions and feelings automatically turns into actual harm and decay because it is a self-fulfilling prophecy: given the area=s looks, respectable people will avoid the area and sell out, which drives down property prices and leads to empty stores, more crime, and so on. This, presented by Kelling and
Wilson as a completely new thought, was in fact a longstanding truth about the urban, going back to the days when zoning law emerged out of nineteenth century nuisance law. To cite just one earlier legal occurrence of this argument, Mel Ravitz, an influential urban sociologist, provided the sole expert witness affidavit in the landmark Detroit adult-zoning case Young, and there he stated:
That the ordinance in question seeks to restrict the concentration of specified uses on the ground that any such concentration is an actual danger sign in a residential neighborhood. It is such a threat in that it leads people to believe that the neighborhood is declining and more of the kind of people who accept a declining neighborhood will flock there. This process hastens the reality of neighborhood decline. (Exhibit 1 in Young, US Supreme Court 1976, p. 5).
The temporal hybridity of discourses about urban vice that is performed through and in the term >blight= used in zoning and other cases is thus but the tip a powerful urban law discourse in which the reputation of a neighbourhood B that is, the perception that respectable citizens have of that neighbourhood B is taken as something one can presume to be a social fact, not for sociological studies, whose logic would eschew mixing opinion with face, but for legal purposes. (Young 427 US [1976] ).
>Blighting= and >downgrading= are powerful linguistic tools precisely because of their hybridity: they connote moral decline, economic recession, and physical deterioration, all at once, through the same words. And certain land uses B porn theatres, porn bookshops B are said to promote blighting Aby their very nature@. If blight is inherent in some land uses, rather than being a potential risk that could be averted through precautionary regulatory requirements or through prudence on the part of the proprietor, blight exists already as soon as the porn store opens. Which means, conveniently for the municipalities and for the appelleate court judges, that few if any inquiries need to be undertaken to determine the actual effects of such shops, in the past or in the (scientifically predictable) future. The future effects can be presumed to be negative because the land use in question is Ainherently@ objectionable.
The ontologically and temporally hybrid objects of urban law and regulation (blight, renewal, downgrading, etc) are venerable ones. But there is nevertheless something new about the knowledge stock of the current cases, certain moves not found in older zoning decisions such as Berman v. Parker and Village of Belle Terre. In the older cases, the desire of white middle-class patriarchal families to isolate themselves from all Others in leafy suburbs was taken as auto-effective. In the newer cases, however, two features relevant to the question of knowledge production emerge. The first is an expectation that, at least if a regulation or ordinance is taken to judicial review, the municipality will produce some evidence of harm/risk. The second is a demand that the regulation in question be described and justified as Anarrowly tailored@ or Atargeted@. Just what counts as >narrow= is rarely specified; but there is an indeterminate expectation that municipal regulations be both legally targeted (by having some kind of list of what counts as an objectionable activity or establishment) and spatially targeted, in the sense of acting only on some portion of urban space, and not B as in the Canadian criminal statute analyzed above B over the whole of the public sphere. Let us take each of these features in turn.
Ambivalent utilitarianism: producing evidence of harm to >communities=
In 1986, the municipality of Renton (a suburb of Seattle) had sought a Supreme Court decision that would allow it to zone porn theatres out altogether, and part of its evidence was a study of the negative effects or associations of such businesses. Renton had no such businesses when the ordinance was drawn up, however. Thus, the study was necessarily borrowed. That studies of much larger and more diverse cities would not be factually relevant in the Renton situation would be the first objection made by a sociologist reading the Renton decision, but of course sociologists were not the intended audience.
And the intended audience, the Supreme Court, ruled that any municipality in the US could use virtually any urban study for the purpose of showing that it had acted legally in drawing up special adult zoning study that had been carried out by Los Angeles city officials (not independent experts) and introduced in evidence. This had compared crime rates in some areas of LA that had many porn shops with crime rates elsewhere in LA. xvii This study had been done before the ordinance at issue in the 2002 decision had been passed. Justice Souter argued that this study hardly constituted the kind of evidence of harm that needs to be produced B not for urban zoning generally, it needs to be said, but more specifically, if a municipality is going to interfere with the First Amendment rights of porn sellers and porn consumers.
O=Connor critiques Justice Souter=s more utilitarian/ realist dissent in the following terms: AJustice Souter asks the city to demonstrate, not merely by appeal to common sense but also with empirical data, that its ordinance [about porn shops] will successfully lower crime. Our cases have never required that municipalities make such a showing@ (City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books 535 US 425, 439
This is a straw-man argument in that Souter never wandered so far from established zoning jurisprudence as to imagine that the appellate courts should adjudicate the question of which policy is best for lowering crime. Souter is not Roscoe Pound. Souter merely asked for more relevant studies to be introduced in evidence (for one thing, the only city regulation challenged by the porn shops was a rule about not having two porn shops under a single roof, a question not contemplated in the 1977 study).
O=Connor=s unfair summary obscures from view the fact that there is a widely shared judicial consensus to the effect that the mechanism of judicial review offers appellate judges a handy tool for managing thorny knowledge issues by sidelining or rendering irrelevant many of the epistemological issues that would greatly preoccupy scientific actors.
The knowledge move that renders discussions about the study=s contents moot is the same formalizing one described at the outset of the article. Is there a study that meets the criteria of proper evidence in the specific case of a judicial review? And the key dynamic or kinetic property of a study deemed to be appropriate evidence in this particular context is that, whether it was actually relevant or not, a municipality had to have a reasonable belief in its relevance: Ain Renton, we specifically refused to set such a a high [evidentiary] bar for municipalities that want to address merely the secondary effects of protected speech. We held that a municipality may rely on any evidence that is >reasonably believed to be relevant=...@ (439) Thus, in Renton, the question was: do municipalities act reasonably in believing that a decades-old study about crime rates is perhaps not determinative but at least >relevant= to the (new) zoning requirement that porn shops be 500 feet from schools and churches and 1000 feet apart from each other xviii ? However odd the chain of reasoning just laid out sounds to a social scientist, given the powers of the judicial review black box to generate valid legal currency out of epistemological odds and ends, the normal judicial answer to the constitutionality question was >yes=. In the LA Alameda Books case, the impugned ordinance was somewhat different, involving a prohibition on operating two porn shops under the same roof. But since the facts about porn shops and their effects had been successfully sidelined already in Renton, invoking Renton in 2002 worked to sideline different facts in the same way in 2002.
O=Connor did not rely only the mere existence of a study to arrive at the conclusion that the city of Los Angeles had acted reasonably. Reverting to Blackstone-type, pre-scientific knowledge objects, the key passage in her decision was: Athe proposition to be shown [by the city] is supported by common experience and a study@ (425). Blackstone=s common experience having suffered blows from multiculturalism and feminism as well as from attacks by social science, however, O=Connor=s text is careful not to simply take the side of the common experience as against science. Just as Souter is not Roscoe Pound, so too O=Connor is not a pure formalist. She thus adds, toward the end of her text, that the >reasonably believed to be relevant= standard Ais not to say that a municipality can get away with shoddy data or reasoning@ (438).
Just what would count as Ashoddy data@ is left unspecified. A clue is offered, however, in an apparently extraneous comment made at the end of O=Connor=s text that has deep roots in the relevant case law.
The clue concerns not scientific criteria of validity but rather the key legal questions of authority and credibility. O=Connor states that zoning law consists of an Aelaborate web of land-use regulations intended to promote the social value of the land as a whole@ (458), and that evaluating the social value of land and land uses (as distinct from economic value, which is presumably within the jurisdiction of appraisers and real estate experts) is something that municipal councils do better than courts. Regarding the social value of land, she states with finality, Athe Los Angeles city council is in a better position than the judiciary to gather and evaluate data on local problems@ (458). So we still don=t know what would count as shoddy data, but we know that city councillors are authorized producers of data, not courts. Knowing best is a longstanding feature of the paternalistic logic of police-powers (Dubber 2002) . In the Blackstonian paradigm, the sovereign knows best in part because he has jurisdiction B or perhaps he had jurisdiction because he always already knew best, the logic being implicit and hence fuzzy. But rather than quoting Blackstone, the Supreme Court prefers to invoke the more contemporary evidentiary commodity of personal experience, Afirst-hand knowledge@ (Erie 298). Now, first-hand knowledge B eyewitness evidence B is generally contrasted to expert evidence.
However, in this text, the councillors= first-hand knowledge seems to differ from that of eyewitnesses, perhaps because they are presumed to always wear their regulatory, city-father hats when prowling the streets of the tenderloin districts. Gilding the knowledge lily, the court then claims that first hand knowledge, of sexual vice at any rate, somehow qualifies one as an expert:
The council members, familiar with commercial downtown Erie, are the individuals who would likely have first-hand knowledge of what took place at and around nude dancing establishments there, and can make particularized, expert judgements about the resulting harmful secondary effects (Erie 298).
In this decision, which most lawyers would simply label as deferential to municipalities, without further ado, we can see that what goes on inside the black box of >deference= is the following: courts construct a epistemological hybrid made up of (1) 
The object of the councillors= peculiar first-hand/expert knowledge, Athe streets@, is, incidentally, not coterminous with any particular set of addresses on the city map. It is not a purely geographical entity.
>The streets= exist here in ontological limbo, somewhere between the physicality of the built urban environment and the purely legal space that is created by jurisdictional rules assigning streets to local government, highways to states, and air corridors to the federal government. That Athe streets@ invoked in this and other decisions are not quite the ones upon which the rest of us walk or drive is clearly evident in the fact that Kennedy=s sentence would not work if he had said Athe freeways@ instead of Athe streets@.
LA city councillors probably spend more time on freeways than on streets: but, legally (and culturally), the freeway is not a useful image in this context. AThe street@ is a cornucopia of cultural, legal and symbolic capital (e.g. >The man on the street=; >streetwise=). Because municipalities have jurisdiction over streets, as any citizen complaining about potholes knows, then municipal governments can deploy the rich symbolic capital of Athe streets@, without any mediation, as municipal legal capital. Jurisdiction can be turned into authorized knowledge of the urban without any explicit argument.
The dissent written by Justice Souter at first distances itself from the judicial conflation of jurisdiction with knowledge of urban vice, since its key argument is that the city did not provide sufficient relevant evidence of harm.
Requiring empirical justification of claims about property value or crime is not demanding anything Herculean... These harms can be shown by police reports, crime statistics, and studies of market value, all of which are within a municipality=s capacity or available from the distilled experiences of comparable communities... And precisely because this sort of evidence is readily available, reviewing courts need to be wary when the government appeals not to evidence but to an uncritical common sense in an effort to justify such zoning restrictions (458).
While sharing social science=s disparagement of common sense, Souter nevertheless does not reach the social-science conclusion, namely, that if common sense is to be interrogated, independent experts ought to be asked to produce expert evidence. Souter wants evidence, but not from social scientists:
Increased crime, like prostitution and mugging, and declining property values in areas surrounding adult businesses, are readily observable, often to the untrained eye and certainly to the police officer and urban planner. (20) What Souter is doing is thus not taking the side of the social, but rather deploying one dimension of old police science/police powers (administrative knowledge [Levi and Valverde 2001] ) as against another dimension (the power/knowledge of city councillors). Souter wants the city to produce reports, in the style of German police-science (Knemeyer 1980), instead of simply letting city councillors use their firsthand/expert knowledge of streets and urban vices.
The porn shop as a moving target: the aporias of >narrowly tailored= ordinances
Apart from using B or invoking B studies, the other knowledge move that distinguishes the more recent adult-zoning cases from traditional zoning law is the demand that zoning ordinances (at least those respecting businesses and persons protected by the First Amendment) be >narrowly tailored=. Thus, municipalities cannot prohibit panhandling throughout the city, but they can ban panhandlers from certain locations. In the case of adult zoning, current law has it that municipalities cannot ban all pornography sales; but bookstores and video arcades that count as Aadult@ establishments can be subject to special regulations such as the requirement that these businesses be more than 1,000 feet from one another. Now, as a matter of urban experience it is not difficult to distinguish a convenience store that sells porn from a porn bookstore; but law is a very blunt tool for the regulation of consumption.
The adult zoning ordinances do not in fact even try to define a pornography business. Instead, they do something that has defeated generations of judges, namely, define pornography itself, that is, the kind of publication that constitutes Aadult@ material. In the definition that has been recycled in countless municipal ordinances across the US, including LA, adult material is defined as featuring Aspecified sexual activities@ and/or Aspecified anatomical areas.@
The list of such activities and areas is highly masculinist, since female arousal does not count for adult designation purposes, whereas showing Ahuman male genitals in a discernibly turgid state, even if completely and opaquely covered@, suffices to mark a publication as adult. But content analysis is not our purpose here, so let us turn our attention to the kinetic uses of the list of >adult= activities and anatomical areas.
Because of its length and pornographic attention to detail, the list gives an impression of great precision, and hence appears as an appropriate tool for modern, tailored, >smart=, targeted governance (Valverde 2003b) . Unfortunately for judges, while the list is precise all right, its precision is legally beside the point. This is because the adult zoning ordinances are not like film classification schemes. It is not the publication that is the regulatory object; rather, the publication=s character is merely a clue to the character of the business in question, since municipal licensing and zoning concern establishments, not publications. And great imprecision is found at the key switchpoint linking the publications to the business. An adult business is defined merely as one having a Asubstantial@ or Asignificant@ part of its stock in adult publications.
Let us thus turn to the business classification work of the Los Angeles zoning inspectors, the personnel who in practice constitute the meaning of >adult=. This is documented in the brief submitted by the porn bookstores in the Alameda Books case. The lawyer (Petitioners= brief, Alameda Books, 2000 US Briefs 799) first describes the preliminary phone calls made to ensure compliance with the zoning regulation B going on to express a no doubt disingenous shock about how administrative discretion operates.
In not one of the proceedings in which I [the laywer] was involved did any of the City officials ever give any objective guidelines or criteria... the City officials candidly admitted that it was a completely subjective text and it depended upon whether the particular location struck the particular City zoning inspector as an >adult bookstore= or an >adult arcade=.
With the brief, the lawyer for the businesses submitted excerpts from the depositions made by zoning inspectors. Like the appellate judges who, overburdened by court documents and studies, look for ways to turn factual information into simpler and more formal objects, the front-line officials too have to manage the vast amount of information that is potentially available to them by performing certain common bureaucratic moves --including using a global judgement rather than a detailed analysis of each publication to decide whether a bookstore is a porn shop and hence subject to the Anarrowly tailored@ ordinance in question. The necessary failure of the attempt to contain damage to freedom of expression by >tailoring= zoning regulations is hence clearly rooted in a broader process: the aporias caused by attempts to save the state=s police powers by claiming that regulations are, as they say in the military as well as in pharmacology, >smart=. The zoning powers of municipalities are, by definition and by the history of the common law, extremely broad and extremely intrusive (Novak 1996 , Frug 1999 ;
whether tailoring or targeting can ever succeed in making the exercise of such powers more rational, less intrusive, and smarter remains to be seen.
Conclusion
A number of unexpected findings about how legal actors (including witnesses at hearings and officials, not only courts and lawyers) use and transmute knowledge bits have emerged in the course of these case two case studies. Let us review the main findings before concluding with a methological comment.
First, in regard to claims about law, we have seen in the Canadian study that ordinary witnesses discussing their experience of living alongside prostitutes tended to use the crucial terms Anuisance@ and Acrime@ more legalistically than the Supreme Court: they thought they had to prove that prostitution was more than a nuisance, hence not a nuisance, in order to argue for its criminalization. The Court, however, was happy to (unanimously) claim that street soliciting constituted something previously unknown to law: a Asocial nuisance@. The two feminist judges, however, distinguished Asocial@ nuisances, which presumably require social remedies, from Alegal@ nuisances, which they, like their male colleagues, did not distinguish from Acrimes@. In this way, jurisdiction was taken for granted, >blackboxed= as they say in Science and Technology Studies, by the public, but not by the court B perhaps precisely because they are the Supreme Court. And while the residents and mayors and other witnesses tried hard to argue along legal lines, the Supreme Court preferred to rely on a second-hand version of a certain sociological knowledge, namely, the broken-windows theory of urban disorder and crime, to justify a statute that, if considered strictly within the network of constitutional law, would be difficult to justify given the new Charter of Rights. The Supreme Court did not take jurisidiction seriously, deliberately blurring the line between nuisance and crime, whereas other actors took jurisdiction as a fixed given, and proceeded to argue within that framework.
Jurisdiction played a different role in the judicial review of ordinances undertaken by the US Supreme
Court. Here, municipal jurisdiction appears as a taken-for-granted black box for all parties, insofar as state or federal criminalization of >adult= establishments was never considered. But municipal jurisdiction is not a static legal machine that produces a predictable judicial result. It is also a highly dynamic knowledge machine. The box that lawyers simply label >deference= turns out, on close analysis of its knowledge contents, to function as a dynamic resource. By the same decision that affirms their ancient jurisdiction over streets and over urban disorder (as opposed to crime), municipal councils are also endowed with more epistemological authority than they asked for. Reliable knowledge of urban ills and their solutions is imputed to them by courts. This knowledge turns out to be a curious hybrid of (1) jurisdiction itself; (2) >first-hand= local experience of local problems; and (3) >expert= authority to solve those problems.
The general claim made here about the utility of analyzing the movement and the uses of knowledge bits independent of the content of factual claims is not, however, a call to return to a neo-formalism B although I do want to draw critical scholars= attention to the need to closely study the specificity of legal mechanisms such as judicial review, instead of moving too quickly to generalize about law and its power. While the specific knowledge claims about porn shops or about prostitutes made at lower levels may be >leached out= as the cases proceed to the appellate level, in part through the mechanism of turning studies and other evidence into merely formal entities, nevertheless, in a general way, the content of cases does matter. The same courts that happily impute authority over zoning policy to city councillors would hardly defer either to their >first-hand= or to their >expert= knowledge if the city water supply were at issue.
Thus, the method used here B the analysis of the way in which actors from ordinary witnesses to supreme courts borrow, repackage, and send knowledge claims along the networkB while emphasizing legal nuts and bolts more than is common in critical sociolegal work, is nevertheless not out of keeping with the fundamental insight of law-and-society scholarship about the mutually constitutive relations that obtain between legal networks and extralegal networks. Its >distinction= lies simply in emphasizing that, since the world we live in is always in flux, as philosophers from Heraclitus to Nietzsche have told us, we should try to develop analytic tools that are appropriate to understand the movement, not just the static relations, of the hybrid social-legal claims that are the raw material of >law=. ii. Latour=s study of the Conseil d=Etat (2002) is antiformalist in that it refuses to take the textual product of the Conseil B the cases B as its object (indeed, he seems to make a point of not reading the cases). But in a sense it reproduces the formalist ideology. While discussing the important role, indeed the agency, of such material >details= as the arrangement of pigeon-holes for documents and the way in which paper clips organize and reorganize the raw material, he nevertheless never looks outside of the window of the Conseil, or otherwise pursues the previous existence or the subsequent fate of any of the actors of the Conseil, human, textual, or material. [THANKS HERE TO R for this point]
iii. While finding the term >immutable mobile= useful, I would stress the >mobile= more than the >immutable=, and would indeed query whether it makes sense to think of the map being hand drawn by Samuel Champlain in New France as >the same= as the fair copy sent off to Paris to enable colonial governance. Additionally, it has to be pointed out that other researchers developed very similar conceptual tools independently of Latour and company. A notable example is Bernard Cohn=s careful analysis of the knowledge formats used by the British to govern India at a distance (Cohn1996), a work that is not referenced in the rather hermetic literature produced by ANT/Science studies scholars but that constitutes a major contribution to the methodology of the sociology of knowledge.
iv. Like other sociolegal scholars I would of course agree with Stanley Fish that law Awishes to have a formal existence@ (Fish 1994) . Relating this influential observation to this article=s methodological interests, we could say that it is precisely the fact that legal institutions and discourses are constantly seeking a formal, i.e. autonomous, mode of existence that prevents such institutions from consistently upholding either side of the modern binary (nature vs culture) analyzed by Latour (1993) . The autonomy and prestige of law would be compromised by too close an alignment with either side of the binary; hence, neither the positivist sciences nor the interpretive human sciences are ever likely to dominate legal proceedings, however crucial they might become at particular legal junctures.
v. A related point is made in Ron Levi=s analysis of the productivity B for the legal system B of the practice of Afact bargaining@, which makes facts literally disappear from the record. Levi=s paper points to a need to further research law=s tools for ignoring or disappearing knowledge claims, tools generally ignored by sociolegal scholars bent on pursuing relations of power/knowledge, not those of power/ forgetting. (Levi 2002) vi. Certain tools for working up knowledge claims are shared across a field B say, the legal field, or the somewhat narrower field of administrative law. Others are site-specific B e.g. specific to the process of cross-examining eyewitnesses.
vii. The transcript of the lengthy hearings before the House of Commons and the Senate committees dealing with Bill C-49 (which became the law criminalizing all soliciting for the purposes of prostitution in all public spaces) documents noise and disorder in one neighbourhood in Vancouver, one in Halifax, and one in Niagara Falls, with very occasional references to street soliciting in Toronto and Montreal. The only ordinary citizens to testify were from Halifax and Vancouver. Perhaps because one of these cities happens to be on the east coast and another on the west coast, parliamentarians and others (especially the Minister of Justice, John Crosbie), referred to soliciting as a national, >coast to coast= problem B ignoring the fact that nothing was heard from or about the countless municipalities lying in the vast stretches of Canada between these two cities. This kind of construction of a >nation= out of a few not at all representative but symbolically important bits is of course hardly unique to this issue, or to Canada.
viii. The Fraser Committee on Prostitution and Pornography, which had held hearings across the country to much media interest, had taken a strong law-and-order approach to pornography but had recommended a liberalization of Canada=s prostitution laws, going so far as to contemplate legalizing two or three women working together indoors. Appointed by the Liberals, the Committee became less authoritative as the federal conservatives, led by Prime Minister Brian Mulroney, replaced the Liberals. It was Mulroney=s conservative government that turned Bill C-49 into law.
ix. The Elizabeth Fry Society, a feminist organization that works with women >in conflict with the law=, attempted (as did the National Association of Women and the Law) to put soliciting back in the local legal category of >nuisance=, thus decriminalizing it: AWe feel the behaviour of prostitutes on the street, while not desirable, is certainly a nuisance, but we do not feel it comes within the ambit of serious harm.@ (Hansard 29 Octo. 1985, 5:41) . The defensive tone of this intervention accurately reflects the political situation at that time, since it was clear to all concerned that the Tory government would quickly criminalize soliciting.
x. There is a vast literature, much of it out of Chicago, on contemporary >disorder=, which is generally felt to be increasing even as crime rates go down. One influential study, which contains an account of >disorder= as a scientific object, is Sampson and Raudenbush, 1999. xi. Most of the text of most of the provincial briefs took a black-letter constitutional tack, arguing that the law did not breach various sections of the Charter of Rights by the use of statute and case law (e.g. briefs from Saskatchewan and Alberta). Here I deal only with those sections of certain briefs that directly addressed the nuisance/crime binary, either sociologically or legally.
xii. The proper citation is: Reference re ss. 193 and 19.1(1) of the Criminal Code, 3 C.C.C. (3d), 1990, at 65. Justices Dickson, La Forest, and Sopinka signed the main decison; Justice Lamer wrote a concurring opinion that differed only on points not relevant to our purposes here, and, finally, Justices Wilson and L=Hereux-Dube, well known as the most feminist the Canadian Supreme Court has had, wrote a minority decision harshly criticizing the criminalization of street soliciting, using both utilitarian arguments (complete with John Stuart Mill quotations) and feminist arguments.
xiii. The leading Canadian law text on nuisance, Beth Bilson=s textbook, approvingly quotes a court=s words: AThe sphere of nuisance may be described generally as >the neighbourhood=@ (Bilson 1991, 48) .
xiv. The leading US Supreme Court decisions authorizing municipalities to use draconian measures to deal with >blight=, including moral blight such as strip clubs and porn shops, are Young (1976) and Renton (1986), about which more below.
xv. Mitchell Duneier=s fascinating ethnography documents how Manhattan sidewalk vendors took advantage of the protection granted to publications under the First Amendment to continue selling books and magazines without any municipal regulation even after the municipal government had undertaken a campaign to eliminate all other street vendors (Duneier 1999) . Thus, what a casual foreign visitor to Greenwich village might regard as a peculiar American interest in print commodities is actually a legal creation, the product of a First Amendment jurisprudence that vendors who use speech to sell trinkets or clothes are unable to deploy in their favour.. xvi. A recent study of Canadian municipal law (Chipman 2002) shows that one of the country=s most powerful authority over urban planning and zoning decisions, the Ontario Municipal Board, uses and validates hybrid knowledges of urban vice, in which aesthetic, moral, economic, and social considerations are thoroughly mixed with no particular prioritization or explanation, in much the same way as the US decisions under study here. See also Cooper 2002. xvii. I have been unable to obtain a copy of the 1977 study, so I am here relying on second-hand descriptions.
xviii. There has never been a social-science type justification for the 500-foot and the 1000-foot rules. They are routinely used in adult zoning ordinances simply because those figures were in the original Detroit ordinance upheld in 1976. An interesting article could be written analyzing the difference between the better known >numeration= practices of social science, on the one hand, and the numeration practices of law, which are generated in distinct ways and circulate from one text to another through
